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Abstract—Nowadays, mobile handsets combine the 
functionality of mobile phones and PDAs. Unfortunately, 
mobile handsets development process has been driven by 
market demand, focusing on new features and neglecting 
security. So, it is imperative to study the existing challenges 
that facing the mobile handsets threat containment process, 
and the different techniques and methodologies that used to 
face those challenges and contain the mobile handsets 
malwares. This paper also presents a new approach to group 
the different malware containment systems according to their 
typologies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, mobile handsets are becoming more intelligent 
and complex in functionality, much like PCs. Moreover, 
mobiles are more popular than PCs, and are being used 
more and more often to do business, access the Internet, 
access bank accounts, and pay for goods and services. This 
resulted in an increased number of criminals who wants to 
exploit these actions for illegal gains. 
Today's malware is capable of doing many things, such 
as: stealing and transmitting the contact list and other data, 
locking the device completely, giving remote access to 
criminals, sending SMS and MMS messages etc. Mobile 
malware causes serious public concern as the population of 
mobile phones is much larger than the population of PCs [1-
6]. 
The first proof-of-concept of mobile malware was 
"Cabir" [7], which was proposed in 2004 targeting Symbian 
OS. After that, mobile malware evolved rapidly during the 
first two years (2004 - 2006) of its existence. A wide range 
of malicious programs targeting mobile phones appeared, 
and these programs were very similar to malware which 
targeted computers: viruses, worms, and Trojans, the latter 
including spyware, backdoors, and adware. Now a days , the 
amount of malware for mobile devices have been duplicated 
more than one time. This shows that the growth rate 
demonstrated between 2004 and 2006 has been maintained.  
In response to this increasing threat, this paper was 
developed as a survey to contain this critical phenomenon. 
The paper is organized to introduce the challenges of the 
mobile handsets malware containment and facing operation 
in section 2. Section 3 shows the different techniques which 
were proposed by researchers to face the mobile malware. 
Then, in section 4, a new approach to group the malware 
containment systems according to their typologies is 
introduced. To the best of authors' knowledge, this approach 
of grouping is never introduced before. Finally, in section 5, 
this work is concluded. 
II. MOBILE MALWARE FACING CHALLENGES 
Although the great dangerous of mobile handset 
malware, and the importance of finding a solution to limit 
this danger, the task of facing mobile handset malware and 
limiting their harm has a lot of obstacles and is not easy to 
be faced. In this section most of those obstacles are 
concluded [1-6]: 
• Some of mobile handset users treat mobile handset 
malware as a problem which has not happened yet, or 
believe that it's not an issue which really concerns 
them. 
• A mobile handset has limited processing power and 
storage capacity, unlike resource-rich PCs, a 
detection framework should not consume too much 
of the device resources, including CPU, memory, and 
battery power, the overhead for executing the 
detection framework should be kept to a minimum. 
• Most new malicious programs for mobile handset 
devices are hybrids, containing functionality from 
two or more different types of malware.  
• When virus writers realized that there was no clear 
leading operating system for mobile devices, they 
also realized it wouldn't be possible to target the 
majority of mobile device users with a single attack. 
Because of this, they started focusing less on writing 
malware which targeted specific platforms, and more 
on creating programs capable of infecting several 
platforms. 
• While a computer is primarily connected to the 
internet via IP networks, a mobile handset also 
connects to the cellular network through SMS/MMS 
services, as well as its Bluetooth interface that is 
frequently used to interact with other devices. These 
interfaces are quickly becoming the new infection 
vector for viruses, which makes the mobile handset 
susceptible to get infected even when it is 
disconnected from the internet. 
• A mobile handset is highly mobile and always on, 
resulting in a greater degree of difficulty in 
quarantining the virus in a local region. 
• To evade detection, malware writers are increasingly 
using polymorphic coding techniques. Polymorphism 
is a process through which malicious code modifies 
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its appearance to evade detection without actually 
changing its underlying functionality. These 
techniques include everything from modifying the 
names of internal variables and subroutines, 
changing the order in which instructions appear in 
the body of malware, to encrypting most of the 
malware code, only leaving in the clear text the 
instructions necessary to decrypt the code [1]. In 
addition to changing the appearance of malware via 
polymorphism, new malware can further change their 
behavior, going through metamorphism; 
metamorphic code actually changes the functionality 
of malware, while hiding its payload using 
obfuscation and encryption [1]. When metamorphic 
techniques are used in conjunction with 
polymorphism, malware of this kind are much harder 
to detect, analyze, and filter. 
III. MOBILE MALWARE FACING TECHNIQUES 
An effective detection frame work should be able to 
detect diverse types of malware and malware variants, 
keeping both false-negatives and false-positives below a 
certain acceptable threshold; also it should not consume the 
device resources. 
There are set of approaches for preventing mobile 
handset from malware as shown in Fig 1. The simplest of 
them is to only trust and install digitally signed applications 
[4]. This ensures that the software has undergone a standard 
testing procedure as part of being signed. However, given 
the vast number of mobile applications available on the 
Internet, especially peer-to-peer sites, one cannot expect all 
applications to be signed with a certificate. An application 
that has been self-signed cannot be trusted to be free of 
malicious code. Moreover, even when an application is 
signed by a trusted CA, a malicious program can still enter 
the system via downloads (e.g., SMS/MMS messages with 
multimedia attachments), and it may exploit known 
vulnerabilities of an unsigned helper application. 
Signature-based detection is another will known 
procedure for handling mobile handset malwares. It is relays 
on static file signature which make it vulnerable to simple 
obfuscation, polymorphism, and packing techniques. Also 
the needing of a huge database to store a signature for each 
malware makes this technique unsuitable for mobile devices 
which suffer from limited resource. 
An alternative to signature-based methods is the 
behavioral-based detection, which has been emerged as a 
promising way of preventing the intrusion of spyware, 
viruses and worms. 
A. Signature-Based Detection 
Signature-based detection is one of the most known 
techniques for malware detection. To identify malwares, 
signature-based detection systems compare the contents of a 
file to a dictionary of malware signatures. There are well 
developed signature-based techniques for malware detection 
on the PC domain, but it requires considerable effort to 
adapt these techniques for mobile handsets. Also, signature-
based detection techniques are unsuitable for mobiles 
because those techniques require a new signature for every 
single malware variant. However, mobile handsets have 
severe resource constraints in terms of memory and power. 
Some of researchers attempted deal with these 
difficulties, and to adjust signature-bases detection 
algorithm to fit the mobile device. Deepak and Guoning [8, 
9] suggested a system for detecting malware using malware 
signatures. This system automatically extracts a set of 
signatures from existing malware samples. It reduced the 
number of signatures by using a common signature for a 
malware and its variants. 
Also, it minimized the total false alarm rate of malware 
detection by extracting signatures that are most uncommon 
within mobile network traffic. Deepak and Guoning outlined 
the considerations for malware detection on mobile devices 
and proposed a signature matching algorithm with low 
memory requirements and high scanning speed. They used 
hash table and sub-signature matching to scans the network 
traffic. 
Although deepak solution consumes less than 50% of the 
memory used by Clam-AV while maintaining a fast 
scanning rate [8], signature-based detection methods still 
suffer from a lot of other weaknesses which make most of 
proposed signature-based solutions unsuitable for mobile 
handset [1, 4, 6]. Signatures are created using static 
information, thus being vulnerable to simple obfuscation, 
polymorphism, and packing techniques. Also, it is 
challenging to distribute virus signatures files to the mobile 
handsets in a timely manner. Even though, only one 
signature is required for a malware and its variants, the 
amount of those signatures is still more than the amount of 
malware behavior signatures, which are changed rarely. 
Moreover, anti-virus solutions for mobile devices rely 
only on signature-based detection could not be considered as 
Conclusive solutions.  Although the infected files are 
deleted by the anti-virus tool, the underlying vulnerability is 
not patched. As a result, a cleaned handset may get infected 
again by another instance of the same virus, requiring 
repeated cleanup. 
B. Behavioral -Based Detection: 
In behavioral-based detection techniques, the behavior of 
an application is monitored and compared against a set of 
malicious and/or normal behavior profiles. The malicious 
behavior profiles can be specified as global rules that are 
applied to all applications, as well as fine-grained 
application-specific rules [4-10].  
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Behavioral detection is more flexible to deal with 
polymorphic worms or code obfuscation, because it assesses 
the effects of an application based on more than just specific 
payload signatures. Considering the fact that a new malware 
variant is usually created by adding new functionality to 
existing malware or modifying obsolete modules with fresh 
ones, this abstraction is effective for detecting previously-
unknown malware variants that share a common behavior 
exhibited by previously-known malware. A typical database 
of behavior profiles and rules should be smaller than that 
needed for storing specific payload signatures of many 
different classes of malware. This makes behavioral 
detection methods particularly suitable for handsets. 
One common problem with behavioral detection, 
however, is specification of what constitutes normal or 
malicious behavior that covers a wide range of applications 
[4], while keeping false positives (incorrect identification of 
a benign activity as malicious) and  false-negatives (failure 
to identify malicious activities) low.  Another one is the 
reconstruction method of potentially suspicious behavior 
from the applications, so that the observed signatures can be 
matched against a database of normal and malicious 
signatures. Heuristics on what behavioral should be 
monitored and how to monitor and collect behavioral vary. 
In the following, some of researchers' efforts to produce 
methodologies for malware detection and relevant 
behavioral measurements are concluded.  
Code Analysis: There are several methods to analysis the 
executable code. For example, D. Venugopal et-el [11] 
proposed an algorithm to monitor each application and 
library (e.g., a dynamic link library (DLL)) that a process 
attempts to load. This information is then compared against 
lists of authorized and unauthorized applications and 
libraries.  
They observed that most viruses in the mobile domain 
demonstrate common functionalities, such as, deleting 
system files and sending MMS messages, so mobile viruses 
are classified into different families or classes based on their 
functionalities. All virus variants in a family share a 
common malicious core behavior. Each malware needs to 
use certain dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to implement their 
functions. The DLL functions used by a virus give a good 
insight into the functionality of this virus. Therefore, the 
imported DLL functions were used as features for virus 
detection. They considered their method is computationally 
efficient since the DLL functions are easy to be extracted 
from the executable files [11]. 
Carsten Willems et-al developed CWSandbox [12], 
which is a malware analysis tool that employ dynamic 
malware analysis, API hooking and dynamic linked library 
(DLL) injection techniques to implement the necessary 
rootkit functionality to avoid detection by the malware. 
Using dynamic analysis techniques, they observed malware 
behavior and analyzes its properties by executing the 
malware in the sandbox. The analysis process can be done 
by taking an image of the complete system state before 
malware execution and comparing it to the complete system 
state after execution, or by monitoring the malwares actions 
during execution with the help of a specialized tool, such as 
a debugger. 
To observe a given malware sample's control flow, it is 
important to access the application API functions. One 
possible way to achieve this is by hooking - intercepting a 
call to a function. When an application calls a function, it's 
rerouted to a different location where customized hook 
function resides. The hook then performs its own operations 
and transfers control back to the original API function or 
prevents its execution completely.  
DLL code injection help in implementing of API 
hooking in a modular and reusable way. However, API 
hooking with inline code overwriting makes it necessary to 
patch the application after it has been loaded into memory. 
To be successful, the hook functions must be copied into the 
target application's address space so they can be called from 
within the target - this is the actual code injection - and 
bootstrap the API hooks in the target application address 
space using a specialized thread in the malware memory. 
CWSandbox system outputs a behavior-based analysis 
that is; it executes the malware binary in a controlled 
environment so that it can observe all relevant function calls 
Figure 1: Mobile malware detection techniques 
 There are well developed signature-based 
techniques for malware detection on the PC 
domain. But, it is: 
 Vulnerable to simple obfuscation, 
polymorphism, and packing  
 Needs of a huge database  
 More flexible to deal with polymorphic 
worms 
 Behavior database is smaller than that 
needed for signatures. But, 
 what behavioral should be monitored and 
how to monitor 
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to the system API, and generates a high-level summarized 
report from the monitored API calls. To enable fast 
automated analysis, the CWSandbox is executed in a virtual 
environment so that the system can easily return to a clean 
state after completing the analysis process. But, this 
approach suffers from some drawbacks, such as, slower 
execution and device overloading. 
Also, Liang Xie et-el [13] assumed that malware always 
launch attacks from the application software. From the 
application's point of view, malware attacks always cause 
anomalies in process states and state transitions. Such 
anomalies are reflected through malware function (API) 
calls, usages of system resources, and requests for system 
services. So, they adopt function call-trace techniques and 
human intelligence techniques in the context of cell phones 
to identify process misbehavior.  
Also they noted that, each cell phone user has his own 
unique and private operational patterns (e.g., while 
operating keypad or touch-screen), which cannot be easily 
learned and simulated by malware. From these two aspects, 
and their behavior-based malware detection system 
(pBMDS) provides comprehensive protection against 
malware. pBMDS leverages a Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) to learn process behaviors (states and state 
transitions) and additionally user operational patterns, such 
that it can effectively identify behavior difference between 
malware and human users for various cell phone 
applications. 
File system Monitoring: A file system can be monitored 
through a number of aspects such as checking file integrity, 
file attributes, or file access attempts. Both file integrity and 
attribute checking can only be determined if a change has 
taken place [1], but file access attempts can be 
predetermined. 
In checking for file access attempts, X. Zhang, et-al [14, 
15] proposed a mandatory access control (MAC) system to 
strictly controls - according to some predefined sets of rules 
- the interactions between subjects (e.g., services or 
processes) and objects (e.g., files, sockets, etc.), which are 
differentiated based on the labels assigned to them. In the 
system an agent with a shim - a layer of code placed in 
between existing layers of code - can monitor all attempts to 
access critical files and stop suspicious attempts by 
comparing policies with the characteristics of the current 
attempt, such as which user / application attempts to access 
what file with a particular type of access (i.e., read, write, or 
execute). 
The main advantage of this approach on mobile handsets 
is that, kernel-level mechanisms are intrinsically trusted, 
simply because that the kernel is a part of the trusted 
computing base. Also a MAC-based isolation is better than 
virtualization techniques due to the pure performance. Since 
mobile phones have limited computational capabilities and 
low power consumption requirements, virtualization 
becomes an impractical solution.  
However, Although MAC mechanisms consume 
substantial computing power on PC platforms (due to vast 
number of subjects and objects), mobile handsets in contrast 
are still limited and cannot be compared to classical PC 
environments in this regard. This significantly simplifies the 
security policies and improves the potential performance of 
MAC mechanisms on mobile devices. But kernel-level 
solutions are too difficult to be implemented. 
Power Consumption Monitoring:  While most malicious 
code attacks on handhelds aim to damage software 
resources, intentional abuse of hardware resources (e.g., 
CPU, memory, battery power) has become an important, 
increasing threat. In particular, malware targeting the 
burning/depletion of battery power are extremely difficult to 
be detected and prevented, mainly because users are usually 
unable to recognize this type of anomaly on their handhelds 
and the battery can be deliberately and rapidly drained in a 
number of different ways.  
H. Kim et-el [1] have designed a malware-detection 
framework, which is composed of a power monitor and a 
data analyzer. The former collects power samples and builds 
a power consumption history with the collected samples, 
and the latter generates a power signature from the power 
consumption history. The data analyzer then detects an 
anomaly by comparing the generated power signature with 
those in a database. 
VirusMeter is another system that was developed by Liu 
L et-el [16] who illustrated that, by monitoring power 
consumption on a mobile device, VirusMeter catches 
misbehaviors that lead to abnormal power consumption. 
VirusMeter relies on a concise user-centric power model 
that characterizes power consumption of common user 
behaviors based on the number or the duration of the user 
actions, such as, the duration of Call, the number of SMS, 
and etc.  
These works have shown that power anomaly is an 
effective indicator for suspicious activities on mobile 
phones. To identify the causes of these activities is still a 
challenge for power-based malware detection as the power 
consumption for normal behavior is yet to be accurately 
quantified. Another challenge is that existing mobile 
handsets is not able to provide sufficient precision for power 
consumption measurement without involving extra 
measuring devices like an oscilloscope [10]. 
Communicational Statistical Modeling: Statistical 
modeling for malware is usually used as a collaboration 
defense for preventing the malware spreading over the 
network. D. Venugopal, Hu. Guoning designed SmartSiren 
[2] which aims to detect worms exploiting SMS messaging 
and Bluetooth communication. This system keeps track of 
the communication activities on the device. In cases where 
abnormal activities have been locally identified, alerts are 
sent to both infected devices and a subset of the uninfected 
devices, which may be in contact with an infected device, 
based on the users' contact lists and mobility profiles. 
IV.  THE PROPOSED GROUPING APPROACH FOR MALWARE 
FACING METHODOLOGIES BASED ON TYPOLOGIES 
To the best of authors' knowledge, there is not any study 
that groups the malware containment systems according to 
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their typologies. But, it is widely found that, the done work 
on the field of mobile malware detection and prevention can 
be grouped into three complementary typologies, as shown 
in Fig 2. 
A. Device-Based Detection Typology: 
Due to the danger of the malware attack which aim the 
mobile handsets, a lot of researchers have concentrate all of 
their attention on the device based solutions. They tried to 
face the malware attacks by proposing detection and 
prevention systems that are completely built on the device 
and they never affect or are affected by the infrastructure. 
For example, Aciicmez et-al [14] developed kernel level but 
general-purpose mandatory access control (MAC) 
mechanisms for main stream operating systems. Typically, a 
MAC system strictly controls the interactions between 
subjects (e.g., services or processes) and objects (e.g., files, 
sockets, etc.), which are differentiated based on the labels 
assigned to them.  
Also, G Tuvell et-el[17] developed a system and method 
for detecting malware with in a device by modeling the 
behavior of malware and comparing a suspect executable 
with the model. The system and method extracts feature 
elements from malware-infected applications. Using 
malware-free and malware-infected applications as training 
data, the system and method heuristically trains the rules 
and creates a probability model for identifying malware. To 
detect malware, the system and method scans the suspect 
executable for feature sets and applies the results to the 
probability model to determine the probability that the 
suspect executable is malware-infected.  
B.  Infrastructure-Based Detection Typology: 
Another set of researchers noted that, each device affects 
and is affected by a not negletable set of other devices, and 
the malware facing will be more proactive if it was in a 
collective manner instead of other individual solutions. 
Those researchers preferred to propose solutions that 
concern with the complete infrastructure. Their solutions are 
based on collecting information from the infrastructure 
components in organized manner. The collected information 
is used in the protection and the malware detection 
solutions. 
For example, V. Karyotis et-el [18] have study the 
propagation of malware over a wireless ad hoc network. 
They proposed a probabilistic model that is able to model 
and capture the aggregated behavior of a large ad hoc 
network attacked by a malicious node, where legitimate 
network nodes are prone to propagate infections they 
receive to their neighbors. They used the Norton equivalent 
representation of the proposed network model that allowed 
them to acquire analytical results of the behavior of the 
system in its steady state.  Depending on the acquired 
relations, they were able to identify the critical system 
parameters and the way they affect the operation of the 
network. 
In order to analyze the influence of various system 
parameters on the network operation and identify which of 
them can be exploited by an attacker or by the network 
itself, they focused on the average number of infected nodes 
and the average throughput of the non-infected nodes, which 
could be indicative of the overall asymptotic system 
behavior independently of a specific network instant.  
Furthermore, the Infection efficiency of an attack was 
obtained through simulation and used as a comprehensive 
attack evaluation metric in order to evaluate the impact of 
attackers on the network for a specific time period and 
scenario, indicating potential short-term variations and 
effects. Also, some insight regarding the behavior and 
evolution of the system when multiple attackers operate 
simultaneously and independently in the network is gained 
via modeling and simulation. 
SmartSiren [2] is another example of infrastructure-
based solution to securing mobile phones despite the 
limitations of post-infected detection. The goal of 
SmartSiren is to halt the potential virus outbreak by 
minimizing the number of mobile handsets that will be 
infected by a new released virus. The outbreak of viruses 
must affect many mobile handsets and cause noticeable 
changes in their behavior. Thus, early detection of viruses 
can be achieved by keeping track of the device activities 
even in a coarse granularity. 
In this system, each mobile handset runs a light-weight 
agent, while a centralized proxy is used to assist the virus 
detection and alert processes. Each mobile handset agent 
keeps track of the communication activities on the device, 
and periodically reports a summary of these activities to the 
proxy. In cases where abnormal activities have been locally 
identified, a mobile handset may also submit a report 
immediately to the proxy. On the other hand, the proxy 
detects any single-device or system-wide viral behaviors. 
When a potential virus is detected, the proxy sends targeted 
alerts to both infected devices and a subset of the uninfected 
devices, which may be indirect contact with an infected 
device, based on the users' contact lists and mobility 
profiles. 
For each user, based on the user-submitted 
communication log, the proxy would keep track of the 
average number of communications that each user initiates 
each day using a 7 days moving average window. The 
summation of the 7 days moving average captures the 
normal usage of each user and is considered as a threshold. 
In addition, each day the mobile handset user's agent will 
count the number of communication that the users have 
initiated. When the user's daily usage exceeds the threshold, 
the user would be moved from normal state into over-usage 
Figure 2: Malware Detection Typologies 
The proposed grouping approach for malware facing 
methodologies based on typologies 
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state. The over-usage state does not guarantee that a 
particular handset is infected. The proxy also monitors how 
many users would exceed their threshold. When this daily 
count exceeds wildly from the average, it can suggest that 
an aggressive viral outbreak has occurred. 
Also, Bose and Shin [3, 4, 6] discussed an agent-based 
malware modeling (AMM) framework that to investigate 
malware exploiting SMS/MMS and Bluetooth 
vulnerabilities on cellular handsets. In AMM, a mobile 
network was modeled as a collection of autonomous 
decision-making entities called agents. The agents represent 
networked devices within the network such as PDAs, 
mobile phones, service centers and gateways. In case of 
agents representing mobile devices, the connectivity 
changes as users roam about the physical space of the 
network. The behaviors of the agents are specified by a set 
of services running on them. 
Thus, there are two types of topologies in Bose and Shin 
simulation environment. The physical connectivity, whereas 
the logical connectivity is determined by the messages 
exchanged among the agents. An agent may participate in 
multiple logical topologies corresponding to different 
services like email, IM, SMS, etc. They also group the 
agents in a hierarchical manner. For example, agents 
representing cellular base stations can keep track of mobile 
devices in their respective cells. Accordingly, these agents 
are able to collect information aggregated over the 
individual devices in their respective cells. This capability 
of higher-level agents to aggregate observations collected 
from lower-level agents reflects real-life processing of 
information within a mobile network. The information 
processed at these different levels can also be used to 
activate different response mechanisms against a spreading 
malware. 
C. Hybrid Typology: 
As it is illustrated previously, mobile handsets have only 
limited resources in terms of computation, storage, battery 
power. Also mobile handset users always annoy from any 
slowing down on the mobile performance, so, the user 
should never be disturbed with the existence of the detection 
systems. Those limitations restrict the device base solutions 
and harden their rule. Although Infrastructure-based 
solutions are computationally more expensive than device-
based solutions, they offload most of the processing burden 
from the resource-constrained mobile handsets, thus 
minimizing the performance penalty on the mobile handsets. 
Also, it is important, for accurate virus detection and 
prompt alerts, the mobile handsets must collaborate with 
each other. Infrastructure-based solutions simplify this 
collaboration among the mobile handsets by using a 
centralized agent that serves such collaboration. Of course, 
the centralized agent marked itself as a performance 
bottleneck and a single point of failure in the system. To 
improve the scalability and resiliency, one can extend the 
architecture with multiple agents. 
Some of researchers have proposed a hybrid approach 
for malware detection and prevention. On this approach, 
part of the detection system is placed in the device, and the 
other part is placed on the infrastructure. For example, A. 
Schmidt et-al [19] introduces an approach of how to monitor 
mobile handsets in order to extract values that can be used 
for remote anomaly detection. Therefore, it has to be learned 
what is the normal behavior of a user and device in order to 
be able to distinguish between normal and abnormal, 
possibly malicious actions. The extracted features are sent 
as vector to a remote system, taking the responsibility for 
extended security measures away from the probably 
unaware user. These vectors can be used for methods from 
the field of artificial intelligence in order to detect abnormal 
behavior. 
Another framework was proposed by H. Kim et-al [1], 
which was composed of a power monitor and a data 
analyzer. The former on the device collects power samples 
and builds a power consumption history with the collected 
samples, and the latter on the remote server generates builds 
a power signature from the power consumption history. The 
data analyzer then detects an anomaly by comparing the 
generated power signature with those in a database. 
Also, Michael Becher [20] has said that, a promising 
approach is an automatic dynamic analysis, where system 
calls are logged and afterwards analyzed for malicious 
behavior. Because of mobile handset limitations, this cannot 
be done efficiently on the mobile handset. They designed a 
Mobile Sandbox to analysis the collected samples in a 
mobile dynamic malware analysis system. It executes the 
sample in an environment (the sandbox), where it can watch 
the steps of the investigated sample. An important 
requirement to ensure the integrity of the analysis is logging 
to a remote place rather than saving the log on the device 
only. Mobile Sandbox implements this communication of 
the device to the host system with a TCP connection over 
ActiveSync.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to their flexible communication and computation 
capabilities, and their resource constraints, mobile handsets 
are glued victim to malwares. A mobile handset can be 
attacked from the Internet since mobile are Internet 
endpoints, or it can be Infected from compromised PC 
during data synchronization; also it can have a peer mobile 
attack or infection through SMS/MMS and Bluetooth. 
Although the difficulties of building a malware detection 
systems, some of researchers have concerned with this field 
of research. Set of researcher have done work to adjust the 
existed PC's signature-based detection systems to be suitable 
for mobiles. But, signature-based solutions have a lot of 
weakness, so another set of researchers preferred behavioral 
based solutions due to their flexibility to deal with 
polymorphic worms, and to the small amount of data needed 
to be stored. However, on behavioral based solutions, it is 
important to specify what constitutes normal or malicious 
behavior that covers a wide range of applications. This 
paper presented and analyzed some of researchers' effort on 
that aspect   
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On other hand, according to detection system typologies, 
this paper has grouped the detection systems into three 
complementary typologies, which are device-based 
detection typology, infrastructure-based detection typology. 
Device-based detection typology faces the resource 
limitation constrains, and has no way that facilitate the 
communication and the collaboration between detection 
systems. However infrastructure-based detection typology is 
computationally more expensive and the centralized agent 
marked itself as a performance bottleneck and a single point 
of failure in the system. In hybrid topologies, a part of the 
detection system is placed in the device, and the other part is 
placed on the infrastructure. 
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